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DOES APPliCATION OF THE APA'S 
"COMMITTED TO AGENCY DISCRETION" 
EXCEPTION VIOlATE THE 
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE? 
AMEE B. BERGIN* 
Abstract: An overly broad delegation implicates two conflicting 
doctrines: the non delegation doctrine and the "committed to agency 
discretion" exception to judicial review. Under a traditional application 
of the non delegation doctrine, courts strike down delegations that lack 
an intelligible principle as unconstitutional, reasoning that Article I 
implicitly prohibits Congress from giving away its legislative power. Such 
a ruling renders the agency powerless, because the agency has no 
authority to act under the failed delegation. Conversely, by prohibiting 
courts from reviewing agency actions in cases where there is "no law to 
apply," the "committed to agency discretion" exception affords an 
agency unfettered discretion when it acts under the authority of an 
overly broad delegation. As such, these two doctrines, which employ 
essentially the same test, dictate contradictory results. Moreover, if 
applied to administrative rulemaking, the "committed to agency 
discretion" exception would be unconstitutional because it would 
violate the nondelegation doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court originally developed the non delegation doc-
trine to ensure that Congress did not transfer its constitutionally 
vested legislative power.! Just as important, the nondelegation doc-
trine also served to check the delegatee's power by ensuring that 
Congress had cabined the delegatee's discretion by providing a guid-
ing intelligible principle.2 In the wake of the New Deal, however, the 
Court began to construe the doctrine much less strictly, upholding 
increasingly broader delegations by finding that relatively vague stan-
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW, 2000-Ol. 
I wish to thank Professor Zyg Plater for his patience in assisting me with this Note. 
1 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,421 (1935);J.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. 
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928). 
2 See J W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
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dards fulfilled the intelligible principle requirement.3 During the past 
thirty years, as the administrative state boomed, courts further sof-
tened enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine.4 Although the 
D.C. Circuit recently resuscitated the "moribund"5 doctrine when it 
held that air quality regulations promulgated by EPA under the Clean 
Air Act (CAA) lacked an intelligible principle,6 the revival proved 
temporary when the Supreme Court unanimously reversed that hold-
ing in February of this year.' As such, the American Trucking decision 
makes clear that the Court's interpretation and application of the 
nondelegation doctrine remains consistent with that of the past sev-
eral decades.s Specifically, the Court reiterated that only in rare and 
extreme instances does a delegation violate the nondelegation doc-
trine.9 
In light of the recent interest surrounding the nondelegation 
doctrine, now is a particularly appropriate time to examine the con-
tradiction embodied by the non delegation doctrine and the "commit-
ted to agency discretion" exception to judicial review. Under section 
701 (a) (2) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ,10 judicial re-
view of an agency action is precluded if the governing statute provides 
"no law to apply."ll Although such a finding is rare,12 in several cases 
the Supreme Court abstained from reviewing an agency action be-
3 SeeYakusv. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). 
4 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
5 See National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 352, 353 (1974). 
6 See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), opin-
ion modified on reh'g, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(per curiam), rev'd sub nom. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903 
(2001). 
7 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903, 912 (2001). 
8 See id. 
9 See id. at 913. The Court explained: 
[i]n the history of the Court we have found the requisite "intelligible princi-
ple" lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance 
for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to 
regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than 
stimulating the economy by assuring "fair competition." 
Id. (citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). 
10 See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2). 
11 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
12 See id. 
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cause it found that the action had in fact been "committed to agency 
discretion. "13 
On a most basic level, the nondelegation doctrine and the 
"committed to agency discretion" exception contradict each other. 
Under the nondelegation doctrine, an extremely broad delegation is 
deemed unconstitutional,14 while under the "committed to agency 
discretion" exception, an agency enjoys virtually unlimited discretion 
when acting under the authority of such a delegation.15 Given that the 
standards for the intelligible principle requirement and "no law to 
apply" test are virtually identical,16 such inconsistent results are highly 
problematic. 
I. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
A. Delegation in the Early Years 
In its strictest and simplest form, the nondelegation doctrine as-
serts that any statute through which Congress17 delegates its legisla-
tive18 power is unconstitutionaI.l9 Both textual20 and structural21 ar-
guments support this reading of the Constitution. Article I, section 1 
states that, "[a]lliegislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States. "22 Structurally, the Constitution estab-
lishes the three branches of government. Each branch is required to 
fulfill its assigned duties, and by implication, forbidden from transfer-
ring its duties to one of the other branches.23 Indeed, in 1989, the 
13 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1994); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 
(1988); Hedderv. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985). 
14 See J W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
15 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. 
16 See infra Section III (A). 
17 This note discusses the nondelegation doctrine at the federal level. For a discussion 
of nondelegation at the state level, see 1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 
(1965); 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.07 etc. (1958); Jim 
Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in 
the States, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1167 (1999). All three authors explain that the non delegation 
doctrine is significantly stricter at the state level than it is at the federal level. See COOPER, 
supra, at 31; DAVIS, supra, at 101; Rossi, supra, at 1167. 
18 This note does not address Congressional delegation of adjudicatory power. 
19 See David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 731, 735-36 (1999). 
20 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
21 See Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondemocracy: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 807, 807 (1999). 
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
23 See Hamilton, supra note 21, at 807. 
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Court explained that, "[t]he nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the 
principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system 
of Government. "24 
The nondelegation argument was made as early as 1813 in The 
Brig Aurora v. United States, in opposition to a congressional act that 
took effect upon the President's declaration that Great Britain or 
France had stopped interfering with U.S. trade.25 The Aurora Court 
rejected the nondelegation argument, however, reasoning that Con-
gress had not delegated its legislative authority to the President, but 
rather had "conditionally" exercised it.26 Although Congress had 
technically delegated its rule-making power to the President in 
Aurora,27 the Court probably upheld the delegation because it was ex-
tremely limited in scope: Congress had provided clear standards re-
garding who was granted authority,28 what was subject to that author-
ity,29 and when the authority could be exercised.3o In essence, 
Congress had significantly restricted the scope of the President's 
power such that he served more as the trigger for an already-enacted 
law than as the legislator of that law. 31 
During the next one hundred years, the Court continued to re-
ject the nondelegation doctrine under the pretense that legislative 
power had not been delegated by Congress.32 In fact, the Court loos-
ened its Aurora standard by upholding statutes even in cases where 
Congress had not provided standards as clear and restrictive as those 
found in Aurora.33 Notably, the Court upheld statutes that did not 
24 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). 
25 See The Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. 382, 383 (1813). The act mandated 
that: 
the President of the United States ... is hereby authorized, in case either 
France or Great Britain shall so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall 
cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, to declare the 
same by proclamation; after which the trade suspended by this act ... may be 
renewed. 
Id. at 383 (quoting§ 11 of the Non-Intercourse Act of Mar. 1, 1809). 
26 See id. at 388. 
27 See id. at 383. 
28 See id. The act delegated power to the President. See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. at 383. 
31 See id. at 388. 
32 See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 
692 (1892). 
33 See Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 515; Fiekl, 143 U.S. at 691-92. 
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make it obvious when the delegated authority could be exercised,34 
and it did so under the continued assertion that a delegation of legis-
lative power in fact had not occurred.35 
For example, in Field v. Clark, the Court upheld a delegation of 
authority that allowed the President to impose a retaliatory tax upon a 
determination that other nations had imposed "reciprocally unequal 
and unreasonable" taxes on American products sold abroad.36 The 
Court characterized the nature of the President's determination as 
factual, and therefore not an exercise of legislative power.37 However, 
the statutory standard of "unequal and unreasonable" is considerably 
more vague and subjective than had been provided by Congress in 
Aurora.38 
Furthermore, in United States v. Grimaud, the Court upheld a stat-
ute that delegated authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to "make 
provision for the protection against destruction and depradations 
upon the public forests. "39 The Court held that the statute did not 
violate the nondelegation doctrine because Congress had not dele-
gated the power to legislate, but merely the "power to fill up the de-
tails" of the act.40 In this way, the Court gradually-and unofficially-
permitted congressional delegations of legislative authority to 
broaden in scope.41 
In a bold 1928 decision, J W. Hampton v. United States, the Court 
admitted for the first time that it was upholding a statute-the Tariff 
Act of 1922-that did in fact delegate legislative power.42 The Court 
reconciled its holding with the nondelegation doctrine by reasoning 
that the delegation of legislative power is constitutional "[i]f Congress 
shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized to [legislate] is directed to conform."43 
Under the Tariff Act, Congress had granted the President the power 
to adjust tariffs whenever it was necessary to "equalize the costs of 
production in the United States and the principal competing coun-
M See Grimaud, 220 u.s. at 507; Field, 143 U.S. at 691-92. 
35 See Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 517; Field, 143 U.S. at 692. 
36 See Field, 143 U.S. at 691-92. 
37 See id. 
!!8 Compare id. with Aurora, II U.S. at 383. 
39 See Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 517. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 SeeJ.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 401, 409 (1928). 
43 See id. 
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try."44 Thus, the Court concluded that the statutory standard "equal-
ize the costs of production" constituted an "intelligible principle" that 
sufficiently restricted the President's power.45 
Although the Hampton Court did not specify how detailed the 
intelligible principle must be, it was satisfied in that case with a gen-
eral statement of purpose46 and a requirement that the President con-
sult experts and make findings.47 Significantly, the Court's motivation 
to uphold the statute seems to have stemmed in part from the practi-
cal concern that certain problems--such as fluctuating tariffs--need 
swift and expert attention, a condition the traditional legislative proc-
ess simply cannot accommodate.48 
B. Delegation in the New Deal Era 
During the New Deal era, Congress enacted a series of statutes 
aimed at rectifying the national economic crisis.49 The Court re-
sponded by giving teeth to the nondelegation doctrine for the first 
time in its history.5o Specifically, during the mid-1930s, the Court 
struck down three statutory provisions as unconstitutional delegations 
of congressional legislative authority. 51 
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court found that Congress 
had granted overly broad legislative power to the President by permit-
ting him to ban interstate shipments of "hot Oil"52 under section 9(c) 
of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) without providing 
substantive or procedural standards to govern his decision.53 
Specifically, the Court held that section 9 (c) was unconstitutional be-
cause "Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, 
has laid down no rule" (i.e., has articulated no "intelligible princi-
44 See id. at 40l. 
45 See id. at 409. 
46 See id. 
47 See J W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. The statute required the President to consult with 
a congressionally appointed Tariff Commission for advice prior to the exercise of his legis-
lative power. See id. at 409. 
48 See id. 
49 See BREYER et aI., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POlley 40 (1999). 
50 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); A.LA. Schechter Poultry Co. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 
(1935). 
51 See Carter Coa~ 298 U.S. at 311; Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541-42; Panama Refining, 
293 U.S. at 430. 
52 See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 436 (Cardozo,]., dissenting). "Hot oil" refers to "oil 
produced or transported in excess of a statutory quota." [d. 
53 See id. at 430. 
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ple"54) defining the conditions under which the President could exer-
cise the delegated power.55 Because the Court viewed the nondelega-
tion doctrine as a constitutional check prohibiting Congress from giv-
ing away its Article I powers, its analysis was focused solely on the 
language and history of the statute.56 In particular, the Court exam-
ined the language of section 9(C)57 and other related provisions of 
NIRA.58 
Significantly, the Court's nondelegation analysis did not include a 
discussion of the manner in which the President exercised the dele-
gated authority. 59 The Court did not review the substance of the 
President's decision, or the process by which the decision was ren-
dered.6o Indeed, the Court rejected the argument that the delegation 
carried an implicit governing standard by virtue of the fact that the 
delegatee was the President, who "has acted, and will act, for what he 
believes to be the public good. "61 Explaining the rationale behind the 
nondelegation doctrine, the Court stated: "The point is not one of 
motives, but of constitutional authority, for which the best of motives 
is not a substitute .... The Congress manifestly is not permitted to 
abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with 
which it is thus vested. "62 In other words, the President's actions could 
not save an otherwise unconstitutional delegation, because the non-
54 See].W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928). 
55 See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430. 
56 See id. at 414-20. The Court explained that its nondelegation inquiry required an 
analysis of the statute "to see whether the Congress has declared a policy ... set up a stan-
dard . . . [or 1 required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority." Id. at 
415. 
57 See id. at 415. The Court concluded that section 9(c) failed to provide substantive or 
procedural guidelines that would have served to limit the President's authority. See id. For 
instance, the Court noted that Congress did not require the President to make findings 
before prohibiting the interstate transport of "hot oil." See id. 
58 See id. at 416. The Court turned first to section 9 to examine the "context" of subsec-
tion (c), and determined that although subsections (a) and (b) did indeed provide limit-
ing standards, those subsections were unrelated to the subject of section 9 (c). See id. The 
Court looked next to other sections of NlRA, but concluded that the general policies ar-
ticulated failed to determine the conditions under which the President could exercise the 
delegated power. See id. at 417. But see id. at 434-36 (Cardozo,]., dissenting) (arguing that 
policies articulated throughout NlRA established standards sufficiently clear so as to gov-
ern the President's decision making). 
59 See id. at 414-20. 
60 See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 414-20. 
61 See id. at 420. 
62 Id. at 420-21. 
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delegation question was determined by the perimeters of the delega-
tion itself.63 
The Court offered a similar analysis in Schechter Paultry, which 
considered the constitutionality of section 3 of NIRA, a provision 
authorizing the President to approve agency-promulgated "codes of 
fair competition. "64 The Court, concerned primarily with the vague-
ness of the phrase "unfair methods of competition, "65 again looked 
only at the language of the statute for an intelligible principle that 
would have curtailed the President's discretion and limited the scope 
of his rule-making authority.66 In particular, the Court emphasized the 
lack of procedural requirements, distinguishing Schechter Paultry, from 
cases in which vague statutory delegations were upheld because Con-
gress had established procedural requirements that served as guiding 
principles.67 Finding that Congress had provided no such guiding 
principle in Schechter Paultry,68 the Court again struck down a statutory 
provision as a violation of the nondelegation doctrine without discuss-
ing the substance of the code, or the process by which it was promul-
gated.69 
In Carter Coa~ the third and final Supreme Court decision to find 
that Congress had delegated its legislative authority in terms too 
63 See id. 
64 SeeA.LA Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-32 (1935). 
65 See id. at 530. 
66 See id. at 529-32. The Court explained: 
[w] e look to the statute to see whether Congress has overstepped these [con-
stitutional] limitations-whether Congress in authorizing 'codes of fair com-
petition' has itself established the standards of legal obligation, thus perform-
ing its essential legislative function, or, by the failure to enact such standards, 
has attempted to transfer that function to others. 
Id. at 530. 
67 See id. at 533-34,539-40 (citing Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. 
Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); 
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913». In 
Nelson Brothers, the Court upheld a delegation to issue licenses "'as public convenience, 
interest or necessity requires'" because Congress had required the Commission to conduct 
hearings. See id. at 540 (quoting Federal Radio Comm'n, 289 U.S. at 285). In Raladam, the 
Court upheld a delegation to prevent "'unfair methods of competition'" because Congress 
had required extensive procedural safeguards, including notice, findings of fact, and hear-
ings. See id. at 533-34 (quoting Raladam, 283 U.S. at 648-54). In Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road Co., the Court upheld a delegation to regulate '''in the public interest'" because Con-
gress had required evidence-based findings. See id. at 539-40 (quoting Louisville & Nashville 
Railroad Co., 227 U.S. at 91-94). 
68 See id. at 542. 
69 See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 529-42. 
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broad, the Court provided very little reasoning on the specific issue of 
delegation.7o In this case, there was neither analysis of the statutory 
language or legislative history, nor mention of the substance or proc-
ess of the delegatee's rule-making.71 Instead, the Court merely pro-
vided a cursory discussion of the delegation issue and treated the out-
come as a foregone conclusion.72 Thus, Carter Coal provided no 
meaningful contribution to the nondelegation analysis set forth in 
Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry. 73 
Taken together, however, the three cases establish a framework in 
which to assess the constitutionality of legislative delegation.74 By re-
stricting the scope of its inquiry to the language and history of the 
statute itself, the Court made it clear in the mid-1930s that the ques-
tion of delegation turned on whether Congress had provided 
sufficient substantive guidance and procedural requirements to cur-
tail the delegatee's discretion.75 The delegation question was not de-
termined by an analysis of the substance of the delegatee's rules, or by 
the actual process by which the rules were promulgated. 76 
After 1936, the Court returned to a broader interpretation of the 
nondelegation doctrine, actually construing the doctrine more 
loosely than it had in the past.77 Most notably, in Yakus v. United States, 
the Court announced an exceedingly generous standard by which leg-
islative delegations would henceforth be assessed.78 The Court rea-
soned that: 
only if we could say that there is an absence of standards for 
the guidance of the Administrator's action, so that it would 
be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the 
will of Congress had been obeyed, would we be justified in 
70 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). 
71 See id. Because the plaintiffs challenged the delegation as soon as the legislation be-
came effective, the delegated authority had not yet been exercised. See id. 
72 See id. Under the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, Congress had delegated rate-
setting power not to another governmental entity, but to private citizens who had a 
financial interest in the rates set. See id. The Court referred to this power as "legislative 
delegation in its most obnoxious form." See id. 
73 See id. at 310-11; Schechter Poult1Y, 295 U.S. at 542; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 
U.S. 388, 415 (1935). 
74 See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 542; Panama 
Refining, 293 U.S. at 415. 
75 See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 531-33; Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 420-21. 
76 See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 531-33; Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 420-21. 
77 SeeYakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). 
78 See id. 
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overriding its choice of means for effecting its declared pur-
pose.79 
This, of course, is a much more lenient interpretation of the intelligi-
ble principle than the Hampton Court had proposed.80 In Yakus, the 
Court upheld a provision of the Emergency Price Control Act that 
directed the Price Administrator to fix prices that "in his judgment 
will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of 
this Act. "81 The Court may have been more willing to accept such a 
vague standard in this case because it afforded Congress more 
flexibility in matters of war and foreign relations.82 
C. Delegation and the Administrative State 
The regulatory boom in the early 1970s83 rekindled the nondele-
gation debate, both in the courts and in law journals.84 The revived 
discussion has been markedly less focused on formalistic constitu-
tional arguments, however, and more concerned with broader philo-
sophical questions of accountability and other democratic principles 
within a representative government.85 Judge Skelly Wright framed the 
issue in this way: "An argument for letting the experts decide when 
the people's representatives are uncertain or cannot agree is an ar-
gument for paternalism and against democracy. "86 Others have ech-
oed this sentiment, and none more adamantly than David Schoen-
brod, who argues that delegation not only allows legislators to avoid 
making tough and unpopular decisions, but that such "buck passing" 
is in fact the legislature's primary reason for delegating its authority.87 
Nadine Strossen takes this argument one step further by suggesting 
79 [d. (emphasis added). 
80 Compare id. withJ.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
81 See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 427. 
82 See id. at 422-23 (explaining that statute in question was "a war emergency meas-
ure"). 
83 Kevin B. Covington, Federal Appellate Court Revives the NondelRgation Doctrine in Envi-
ronmental Case, 73-OCT FLA. BJ. 81, 81. Covington explains that, "[a] fundamental prereq-
uisite for the growth of the federal government in the 20th century has been the ability of 
Congress to delegate broad powers and duties to agencies." [d. 
84 See generally Schoenbrod, supra note 19; Skelly Wright, RevilrW-Beyond Discretionary Jus-
tice, 81 YALE LJ. 575 (1972). 
85 See Schoenbrod, supra note 19, at 732; Wright, supra note 84, at 582. 
86 See Wright, supra note 84, at 582. 
87 See Schoenbrod, supra note 19, at 734. Rejecting the idea that delegation leads to 
better rule making, Schoenbrod maintains that, "[f]rom its inception, the core purpose of 
delegation was to undercut democratic accountability." [d. 
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that delegation directly impinges upon the liberty of all American 
citizens by severely undermining our ability to oppose agency-
promulgated regulations.88 
In response to these democracy-based critiques of delegation, 
Dan Kahan attacks the notion of "democracy" as an evasive, empty-
and ultimately useless-standard by which to assess the validity of dele-
gation.89 He suggests that the many competing notions of what consti-
tutes a "democracy" are particularly malleable in the context of the 
delegation debate, and therefore should be removed from the discus-
sion altogether.90 In an even more direct (and irreverent) attack 
aimed at both the doctrine and the Court, Peter Schuck predicts that 
the non delegation debate is in reality a hollow one, because the Court 
would never dare to revive the nondelegation doctrine in its tradi-
tional (i.e., extreme) form.91 To take the nondelegation doctrine to its 
logical conclusion, he notes, the Court would be forced to dismantle 
the administrative state as we have come to know it.92 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, appears both ready and willing 
to call that bluff.93 In his concurring opinion in Industrial Union De-
partment v. American Petroleum Institute (the Benzene case), Justice 
Rehnquist reacted against what he perceived to be the Court's per-
missiveness in upholding an overly broad delegation of legislative 
power.94 Specifically, Justice Rehnquist called for the revival of the 
nondelegation doctrine in general,95 and argued for its application in 
that case in particular.96 The provision under fire in Industrial Union 
88 See Nadine Strossen, Delegation as a Danger to Liberty, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 861, 864-65 
(1999). A few of the ways Strossen believes delegation threatens liberty are: the tendency 
for agencies to heed the interests of a narrow segment of society, the consolidation of legis-
lative and adjudicatory roles within one agency, and the high level of deference afforded 
to agencies under judicial review. See id. 
89 See Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 795, 795 (1999). 
90 See id. at 796. For example, Kahan explains that the "pluralist" concept of democracy 
values legislation that reflects the electorate's preferences, which conflicts with the "civic 
republican" view that values legislation that results from contemplation of the "common 
good." See id. 
91 See Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenilrod, 20 
CARDozo L. REv. 775, 775 (1999). 
92 See id. 
93 See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) 
(Rehnquist,j., concurring). But see Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 
903, 912-14 (2001) (joining in opinion upholding delegation to EPA to promulgate air 
quality regulations "requisite for human health"). 
94 See id. at 672 (Rehnquist,j., concurring). 
95 See id. at 686-87 (Rehnquist,j., concurring). 
96 See id. at 675 (Rehnquist,j., concurring). 
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was section 6(b) (5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA), which directed the Secretary of Labor to "set the standard 
which most adequately assures [workplace safety] to the extent feasi-
ble. "97 Through an unusually aggressive construction of the phrase "to 
the extent feasible,''9B the majority held that Congress had not vio-
lated the nondelegation doctrine; instead, it struck down the agency's 
safety standard for failing to fulfill the statutorily mandated proce-
dural requirements.99 Referring to the feasibility standard as a "legisla-
tive mirage" that Congress used to avoid resolving a politically 
charged issue, Justice Rehnquist would have struck down the delega-
tion based on an analysis of the statutory language and history.IOO 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by then-Chief Justice Burger, again ad-
vocated for strict application of the nondelegation doctrine in his 
American Textile Manufacturers v. Donovan (the Cotton Dust case) dis-
sent. IOI In the Cotton Dust case, the majority again held that the 
phrase "to the extent feasible" provided sufficient statutory guid-
ance. I02 The Court found that the Secretary of Labor simply had not 
followed the statute's procedural requirements.lo3 Consistent with In-
dustrial Union, the Court's reasoning in this case confirmed that the 
Court answered the delegation question by looking to the language 
and legislative history of the statute. I04 On that basic point, all nine 
justices impliedly agreed.I05 
Despite the urging of nondelegation supporters to the contrary, 
the Court has given no indication that it will return to a stricter view 
of the doctrine. I06 Instead, the Court has continued to uphold broad 
grants of legislative authority,107 sometimes even avoiding the delega-
tion issue altogether by reading statutes narrowly. lOB 
97 See id. at 613. 
98 See Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 642-45. 
99 See id. at 662. 
100 See id. at 673 (Rehnquist,j., concurring). 
101 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 544-48 (1981) 
(Rehnquist,j., dissenting). 
102 See id. at 543 (Rehnquist,j., dissenting). 
103 See id. at 548. 
104 See id. 
105 See generally id. 
106 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903, 912-14 (2001); Lov-
ing v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 
(1989). 
107 See American Trucking, 121 S.Ct. at 912-14; Loving, 517 U.S. at 771; Mistretta, 488 U.S. 
at 374. 
108 See National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974). 
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In National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, the Court 
considered whether a provision of the Independent Office Appropria-
tion Act109 violated the nondelegation doctrine by permitting the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to levy a tax.110 Directly 
acknowledging its desire to avoid the nondelegation issue,111 the 
Court stated that: "the hurdles revealed in [Schechter Poultry and 
Hampton] lead us to read the Act narrowly to avoid constitutional 
problems."112 Through such reasoning, the Court rejected the peti-
tioner's argument that Congress had authorized the FCC to levy a 
tax.113 Rather, the Court read the provision "narrowly as authorizing 
not a 'tax' but a 'fee,''' and thus delegation of legislative power was 
not implicated.114 
In Mistretta v. United States, the Court did not side-step the delega-
tion issue, but simply admitted that it was upholding a broad delega-
tion of authority.ll5 Through the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress 
empowered the United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.116 The Court explained that the dele-
gation was constitutional because Congress had provided substantive 
"goals"117 and "purposes"118 to guide the Commission. The Court also 
109 See id. at 337. The provision at issue states that, "the head of each Federal agency is 
authorized by regulation ... to prescribe therefor ... such fee, charge, or price, if any, as 
he shall determine ... to be fair and equitable." [d. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 483(a». 
110 See generally id. The Court explained that, "[t]axation is a legislative function, and 
Congress ... is the sole organ for levying taxes." [d. at 340. 
m See id. at 342. 
112 [d. 
IU See National Cable Television, 415 U.S. at 341. 
114 See id. 
115 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
116 See id. at 367. 
117 See id. at 374. The Court explained: 
Congress charged the Commission with three goals: to "assure the meeting of 
the purposes of sentencing as set forth" in the Act; to ''provide certainty and 
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoid unwarranted sentenc-
ing disparities among defendants with similar records ... while maintaining 
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences," where appropriate; 
and to "reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of hu-
man behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process. " 
[d. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b)(I». 
118 See id. The Court explained: 
Congress further specified four "purposes" of sentencing that the Commis-
sion must pursue in carrying out its mandate: "to reflect the seriousness of 
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment 
for the offense"; "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct"; "to 
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noted that the legislative history further guided the Commission's 
rulemaking.119 Relative to other delegations, the statutory standard at 
issue in Mistretta was not vague. In fact, it was considerably more de-
tailed than those upheld in previous cases, such as American Textile.I2o 
As such, the most striking aspect of the Mistretta opinion was not 
its holding, but a dramatic statement in which the majority acknowl-
edged that its approach to the delegation question had been shaped 
largely by the growing need for administrative assistance in carrying 
out the business of Congress.121 Specifically, the Court explained that 
its nondelegation jurisprudence "has been driven by a practical un-
derstanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do 
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad directives. "122 
Thus, the Court implicitly reasoned that a fundamental constitutional 
doctrine once meant to protect the basic framework of the govern-
ment123 had given way to more practical concerns.124 In light of the 
Court's increasingly explicit refusals to strike down delegations as un-
constitutional, it is with good reason that some commentators con-
sider the nondelegation doctrine to be dead.125 
D. Delegation and Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. 
It was thus of great surprise126 when in May 1999 the D.C. Circuit 
announced the return of the nondelegation doctrine in American 
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant"; and "to provide the 
defendant with needed ... correctional treatment." 
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2». 
119 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 376 n.10. 
120 Compare id. at 374-75, with American Textile Mfg., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 
508 (1981). 
121 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
122Id. 
123 See id. at 371. The Court explained that, "[t]he nondelegation doctrine is rooted in 
the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government." 
Id. 
124 See id. at 372. 
125 See National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc., 415 U.S. 352, 353 (1974) (calling non-
delegation doctrine "moribund"); Ernest Gellhorn, Returning to First PrinciplRs, 36 AM. U. L. 
REv. 345, 345 (1987); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It 
Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1226 (1986). 
126 See Cass Sunstein, The Court's Perilous Right Turn, NYTIMEs,June 2, 1999 (calling the 
American Trucking decision a "remarkable departure from precedent"); Air Quality Stan-
dards: Court's Decision on Ozone, PM Rules Called "Extreme, Illogical" by Browner, 30 ENV'T 
REp. 158 (May 28, 1999) (reporting that EPA Administrator Carol Browner called the deci-
sion "extreme, illogical and bizarre"). 
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Trucking.127 The court used the long-dormant doctrine to strike down 
final rules revising primary and secondary National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for particulate matter (PM) and 
ozone.128 Like most legislative delegations,129 the Clean Air Act pro-
vided EPA with a fairly vague standard by which to promulgate public 
health regulations.130 The majority agreed with the plaintiff that "EPA 
had construed sections 108 & 109 of the Clean Air Act so loosely as to 
render them unconstitutional delegations of legislative power. "131 
More specifically, the court held that EPA had failed to articulate an 
intelligible principle by which the PM and ozone standards were de-
termined, rendering the congressional delegation of legislative 
authority too broad.132 The case was then remanded back to EPA to 
create an intelligible principle to guide its rulemaking.133 
Critics of the American Trucking decision asserted, however, that 
the court's reasoning was flawed for several reasons.134 First, they ar-
gued that by invoking the nondelegation doctrine, the majority relied 
on case law from the 1930's, thereby ignoring more than sixty years of 
common law precedent in which the Supreme Court has consistently 
rejected nondelegation arguments and upheld extremely broad dele-
gations of legislative power.135 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tatel 
explained that if the court had applied the non delegation doctrine as 
it had been applied in more recent cases, it would have found that 
127 See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), 
opinion modified on reh'g, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(per curiam), rev'd sub nom. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903 
(2001) . 
128 See id. For a brief discussion of the NAAQS, see Craig N. Oren, Run Over by Ameri-
can Trucking Part I: Can EPA Revive Its Air Quality Standards?, 29 ELR 10653, 10654-55, 
10660-62 (1999). 
129 See id. at 1057 (Tatel,j., dissenting). 
uo See id. at 1034. The CAA directs EPA to set standards at the level "requisite to pro-
tect the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety." See id. (quoting § 109(b) (1) of 
theCAA). 
mId. 
U2 See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. The court explained that, "EPA appears to 
have articulated no 'intelligible principle' to channel its application of these [public 
health] factors; nor is one apparent from the statute." Id. 
m See id. at 1038, 1057. 
134 See generally id. (Tatel,j., dissenting); Oren, supra note 128; Cass R. Sunstein, Is the 
Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REv. 303 (1999); Recent Cases, 113 HARv. L. REv. 
1051 (2000). 
135 See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038, 1057 (Tatel,j., dissenting); Oren, supra note 
128, at 10656; Sunstein, supra note 134, at 310. 
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section 109 does in fact pass constitutional muster.IlI6 He reasoned 
that: 
section 109's delegation of authority is narrower and more 
principled than delegations the Supreme Court and this 
court have upheld since Schechter Poultry, and ... the rec-
ord in this case demonstrates that EPA's discretion was in 
fact cabined by section 109.187 
Several scholars supported Judge Tatel's conclusion that the standard 
in question in American Trucking was no more vague than other statu-
tory provisions that have survived nondelegation attacks. IllS 
Moreover, some critics noted that by requiring EPA to develop an 
intelligible principle to guide its interpretation of the CAA,I39 the 
court distorted the Hampton rule, which states that Congress, not the 
agency, must articulate an intelligible principle when delegating legis-
lative power. I40 Thus, as applied in American Trucking, the nondelega-
tion doctrine no longer serves to prevent Congress from delegating its 
legislative power,I4I nor does it provide a check on agency discre-
tion,142 Even one of the plaintiffs attorneys acknowledges that the 
American Trucking decision "establishes a new approach to the consti-
tutional non-delegation doctrine,"143 though he characterizes the de-
velopment as less than "radical. "144 
Finally, critics of the decision proposed that the case should have 
been decided not under the nondelegation doctrine, but instead un-
der the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review,145 
136 See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1057 (Tatel,j., dissenting). 
137Id. 
138 See Oren, supra note 128, at 10655-56 (stating that "this case does not seem a par-
ticularly outstanding example of a vague delegation"); Recent Cases, supra note 134, at 1054 
(stating that "[t]he language of the CAA is considerably narrower than that accepted by 
the Supreme Court"). 
139 See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038. 
140 See Sunstein, supra note 134, at 310, 348-49; Recent Cases, supra note 134, at 1053-
54. 
141 See Recent Cases, supra note 134, at 1054. The author states that, "if the doctrine is 
meant to limit Congress's ability to delegate its legislative authority, it is difficult to see how 
the recipient of the delegation, rather than Congress itself, can remedy the problem." Id. 
142 Seej.W. Hampton,jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
143 Gary Marchant, The American Trucking Associations Decision: Over-Turning the Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone and Particulate Matter (visited Feb. 17, 
2000) <http://merlin.law.mercer.edu/elaw / gmarchant.htm#trans>. 
144 See id. 
145 See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1059 (Tatel, j., dissenting); Oren, supra note 128, 
at 10658; Recent Cases, supra note 134, at 1055. 
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Indeed, the court's own analysis supports this proposition.l46 The ma-
jority focused its analysis of the nondelegation issue on an in-depth 
substantive and procedural review of the NAAQS,147 even going so far 
as to call EPA's standard-setting "arbitrary and capricious. "148 Such 
attention to the substance of the PM and ozone regulations rather 
than the language of the CAA led Judge Tatel to conclude in his dis-
sent: 
[w]hether EPA arbitrarily selected the studies it relied upon 
or drew mistaken conclusions from those studies (as peti-
tioners argue), or whether EPA failed to live up to the prin-
ciples it established for itself (as my colleagues believe ... ), 
has nothing to do with our inquiry under the nondelegation 
doctrine. Those issues related to whether the NAAQS are ar-
bitrary and capricious.149 
Judge Tatel further argued that EPA provided sufficient reasoning to 
defend its standard setting such that regulations should have with-
stood traditional arbitrary and capricious review.150 
In a per curiam decision partially denying EPA's petition for re-
hearing, the D.C. Circuit held en banc that the nondelegation hold-
ing was valid.151 The court also responded to criticisms by further ex-
plaining the rationale behind its new approach to the nondelegation 
doctrine.152 The court reasoned that its new approach to nondelega-
tion was consistent with, and even required by, the Chevron doctrine.153 
The court stated, 'just as we must defer to an agency's reasonable in-
terpretation of an ambiguous statutory term, we must defer to an 
agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute containing only an 
ambiguous principle by which to guide its exercise of delegated 
authority. "154 In other words, the D.C. Court of Appeals extended the 
Chevron doctrine from granting agencies deference under judicial re-
146 See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034-39; see also Oren, supra note 128, at 10658. 
147 See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034-39. 
148 See id. at 1033-34. 
149Id. at 1061 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (citation omitted). See also Recent Cases, supra note 
134, at 1055 (noting that "the American Truckingversion of the nondelegation doctrine is 
... an inappropriate tool for dealing with agency arbitrariness"); Oren, supra note 128, at 
10658 (noting that "American Trucking can readily be explained as deciding that the 
Agency was arbitrary and capricious") . 
150 See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1059-61 (Tatel,J., dissenting). 
151 See American Trucking, 195 F.3d at 6. 
152 See id. at ~. 
153 See id. at 8. 
154 Id. 
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view,155 to granting agencies the opportunity to save what would oth-
erwise have been deemed an unconstitutionally broad delegation of 
legislative power.156 
In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., however, the 
Supreme Court not only reversed the D.C. Circuit's nondelegation 
holding,157 but also sharply criticized the reasoning underlying that 
holding.l58 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia adamantly 
explained that the D.C. Circuit was mistaken in granting EPA the op-
portunity to save the delegation by reinterpreting it more narrowly.l59 
Only Congress, the Court reasoned, can cure an unconstitutional 
delegation, because only Congress has the power to delegate such 
power in the first place.16o Moreover, the Court noted, only the courts 
(not Congress or the agency) have the power to determine whether 
the delegation is constitutionaI.l61 As such, the Court rejected the 
D.C. Circuit's new approach to the nondelegation doctrine. 
The Court further found that there was no need for Congress to 
cure the delegation because the criteria "requisite for human health" 
satisfies the intelligible principle test, and "is in fact well within the 
outer limits of our nondelegation precedents. "162 As such, the Court 
in American Trucking maintained a lenient application of the intelligi-
155 See id. 
156 See American Trucking, 195 F.3d at 8. 
157 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903, 914 (2001). The 
Court summarized the lower court holding in this way: 'The court hence found that the 
EPA's interpretation (but not the statute itself) violated the nondelegation doctrine." Id. at 
912. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. Citing the nonde1egation (Le., intelligible principle) test as originally articu-
lated in J W. Hampton, the Court explained that it has 
Id. 
never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative 
power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute .... 
The very choice of which portion of the power to exercise-that is to say, the 
prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted-would itself be an 
exercise of the forbidden legislative authority. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. The Court explained, "[w]hether the statute delegates legislative power is a 
question for the courts, and an agency's voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the 
answer." Id. 
162 See American Trucking, 121 S.Ct. at 913. As examples of previously-upheld delega-
tions that were even broader than the delegation in American Trucking, the Court cited: 
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946); Yakus v. United States, 321 
U.S. 414, 420 (1944); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 
(1943); New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12,24-25 (1932). Id. 
2001] Nondelegation 381 
ble principle test in a manner consistent with the past seventy years of 
precedent.163 Notably, the Court was unanimous on this point,164 
marking an apparent departure for Chief Justice Rehnquist, who dur-
ing the 1980's had twice called for a stricter application of the non-
delegation doctrine.165 
Interestingly, respondents had argued that the "requisite for hu-
man health" criteria would fulfill the intelligible principle test only if 
the Court found that costs must be considered as part of EPA's "hu-
man health" analysis.166 In other words, respondents were willing to 
concede the delegation issue if the Court would read a cost-benefit 
analysis into the CAA, arguing that the phrase "requisite for human 
health" is unconstitutionally vague unless interpreted to require a 
cost-benefit analysis.167 Rejecting this argument, the Court explicitly 
stated that section 109(b) "unambiguously bars cost considerations 
from the NAAQS-setting process, "168 particularly when read in the 
context of the CAA as a whole, and in light of its legislative history.169 
Moreover, the Court implied that a cost-benefit analysis would actually 
163 See id. 
164 See id. at 919. Although none of the Justices dissented in this case, Justices Thomas, 
Stevens, and Breyer offered concurring opinions. See id. at 919-24. Justice Thomas agreed 
that the delegation in this case met the intelligible principle test, but maintained that the 
intelligible principle test itself may fail to prevent an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive authority. See id. at 919-20. Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Souter) also agreed with 
the Court's upholding of the delegation, but would prefer to "admit" that EPA's rulemak-
ing authority is a form of legislative power, rather than simply "pretend, as the Court does, 
that the authority delegated to the EPA is somehow not 'legislative power'." Id. at 920. 
Lastly, Justice Breyer joined in the Court's nondelegation holding, and concurred with its 
refusal to read a cost-benefit analysis into the "requisite for human health standard." See id. 
at 921-24. 
165 See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text. The Court itself referenced the 
Chief Justice's previous calls for invocation of the nondelegation doctrine, explaining 
that--contrary to respondents' argument in favor of reading a cost-benefit analysis into 
the CAA-it was the lack of a cost-benefit analysis that kept the delegation in American 
Trucking constitutionally intelligble. See American Trucking, 121 S.Ct. at 912-13. 
166 See American Trucking, 121 S.Ct. at 910-11. 
167 See id. Indeed, when pressed during oral argument, respondent conceded the dele-
gation issue, focusing instead on the assertion that the CAA requires EPA to consider costs 
whem promulgating NAAQS. 
168 Id. at 911. 
169 See id. In emphasizing the importance of a contextualized reading of section 
109 (b) , the Court explained that, "Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental 
details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions--it does not, one 
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes." Id. at 909-10. 
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serve to make the "requisite for human health" standard more 
vague.170 
II. "COMMITTED TO AGENCY DISCRETION" 
Chapter 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs 
judicial review of agency actions,171 and lays out two instances in which 
agency actions are excepted from judicial review.172 First, courts are 
barred from reviewing agency actions where Congress has explicitly 
precluded judicial review under the terms of the governing statute.173 
Second, courts are barred from reviewing agency actions that are 
"committed to agency discretion. "174 Because the Court has found 
that the APA carries a strong presumption of judicial review,175 these 
two exceptions have been construed narrowly.176 Specifically, the 
Court announced in 1971177 that it will find an agency action "com-
mitted to agency discretion" only in rare cases where the terms of the 
governing statute are so broad that there is no meaningful law to 
guide the court's decision, i.e., there is "no law to apply."178 
A. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 
The Supreme Court first articulated the "no law to apply" test in 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, where the Secretary of 
170 See supra note 165. At oral argument, Justice Ginsberg made the point succinctly 
when she reasoned that a cost-benefit requirement would only further confuse (rather 
than clarify) the NAAQS-Setting process, and would simply provide respondents and other 
EPA opponents with an additional basis for litigation in the future. 
J7J For a discussion of the availability of judicial review of agency inaction, see Brandon 
L. Pham, Comment, The Federal Endangered species Act: Is judicial Review Available to Safeguard 
Against Agency Decisions Not to Enforce?, 13 UCLA]. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 329 (1994/1995). 
172 See RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCESS 128 (3d ed. 
1999). 
173 See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (1) (providing that judicial review is permitted unless "statutes 
preclude judicial review") . 
174 See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(2) (providing that judicial review is permitted unless "agency 
action is committed to agency discretion by law"). 
175 See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). The Court explained that 
"[t]he Administrative Procedure Act embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to 
one 'suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by 
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute'." Id. 
176 See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 155, at 132-33. 
177 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). For a 
pre-Overton Park discussion of "committed to agency discretion," see Harvey Saferstein, 
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 
367 (1968). 
178 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. 
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Transportation argued that his decision to build a highway through a 
city park was not subject to judicial review because it fell into the 
"committed to agency discretion" exception. I79 Rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court held that the Secretary's decision had not been 
"committed to agency discretion," and therefore did not escape judi-
cial review. I80 Specifically, the Court pointed to the clear statutory 
language governing the use of public parkland as evidence that the 
Secretary did not enjoy unfettered discretion over the placement of 
the highway.I8I Moreover, the Court explained that section 701 (a) (2) 
is "a very narrow exception . .. applicable in those rare instances 
where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case 
there is no law to apply'. "182 
The Court's "no law to apply" reasoning in Overton Park met with 
sharp criticism.I83 Specifically, scholars focused on the possibility that 
the "no law to apply" test could permit agency abuse of discretion to 
escape judicial review.I84 Arguing that the Court misunderstood the 
legislative history on which it based its interpretation of section 
107 (a) (2), Professor Kenneth Culp Davis rejects the Court's proposi-
tion that Congress meant to preclude judicial review of agency actions 
when there was "no law to apply."185 Rather, he maintains that the sec-
tion 107(a) (2) exception was meant only to preclude review of statu-
tory questions, not of an agency's abuse of discretion. I86 Post-Overton 
Park decisions are consistent with the approach advocated by Profes-
sor Davis. I87 
179 See id. at 411. 
180 See id. at 413. 
181 See id. at 411 (quoting § 4(f) of Department of Transportation Act and § 138 of 
Federal-Aid Highway Act, which prohibited Secretary from approving "any program or 
project" involving use of public parkland "unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent al-
ternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to 
minimize harm to such park"). 
182 See id. at 410 (quoting legislative history of § 701 (a)(2». 
18~ See Kenneth Culp Davis, "No Law to Apply," 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 1 (1988); 
Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REv. 689, 
704-05 (1990). 
184 See Davis, supra note 183, at 2; Levin, supra note 183, at 707. 
185 See Davis, supra note 166, at 1 (quoting the legislative history, "'[i]f ... statutes are 
drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply, courts have no 
statutory question to review'"). Professor Davis states emphatically: "[t]he committee did 
not say and did not imply that a court should deny review when it has no law to apply." Id. 
186 See id. at 2. Professor Davis explains that, "Congress stated quite clearly in the APA 
that it intended courts to review administrative action for abuse of discretion, and an abuse 
of discretion mayor may not involve law." Id. 
187 See id. 
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Professor Ronald M. Levin echoes Professor Davis' observation, 
and further criticizes the Court's reasoning in Overton Park by point-
ing out "serious flaws in the Court's apparent holding that the appli-
cability of section 701 (a) (2) turns solely on whether there is 'law to 
apply' to the agency decision. "188 The "flaws" include technical errors 
in which the Court mischaracterize the holding of a previously-
decided case, and twice incorrectly described standards of judicial re-
view of agency actions.189 Most notably, he maintains, by adopting the 
Senate Judiciary Committee's interpretation of section 701 (a) (2), the 
Court failed to draw a meaningful distinction between whether an 
agency action is reviewable and whether it is legal.190 Thus, as articu-
lated in Overton Park, the "no law to apply" test rendered section 
701 (a) (2) superfluous.19l Professor Levin attributes these problems to 
the Court's hastiness in handing down the decision.192 
B. An Increasingly Broader Application of Overton Park 
In response to such criticisms, and in keeping with lower court 
decisions,193 a decade later the Supreme Court began to broaden the 
Overton Park test by declining to exercise judicial review in three 
cases.194 In Heckler v. Chaney, the Court announced that agency deci-
sions not to act are presumptively unreviewable.195 In Heckler, death 
row inmates contacted the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) re-
garding drugs to be used in a newly adopted death penalty proce-
dure.196 The inmates, arguing that the drugs had not been ap-
proved197 for use in human executions, asked the FDA to investigate 
their claim and enforce the regulatory requirements. However, the 
188 Levin, supra note 183, at 705. 
189 See id. at 705,705 n.74. 
190 See id. at 705-06. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. at 705 n.73. Professor Levin explains that, "only three months elapsed from 
the day the Supreme Court granted review until the day when the decision came down." 
Id. 
193 See generally Langevin v. Chenago Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971); Hahn v. 
Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970). 
194 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1994); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 
(1988); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985). For an in-depth analysis of Overton 
Park, Chaney, and Webster, see generally Levin, supra note 166. 
195 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 837-38. 
196 See id. at 823-34. 
197 See id. at 824. Under 21 U.S.C. § 355, the FDA is required to approve "new drugs" as 
"safe and effective" prior to interstate distribution. See id. 
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Commissioner of the FDA declined to act.198 Relying on the "commit-
ted to agency discretion" exception,199 the Court held that the Com-
missioner's decision not to act was beyond the scope of judicial re-
view.2OO More importantly, the Court announced that the presumption 
of reviewability does not extend to agency inaction.201 
In -webster v. Doe, the Court examined the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) Director's decision to discharge security officer '1ohn 
Doe" from employment because he was a homosexual.202 Under sec-
tion 102(c) of the National Security Act (NSA), the Director of the 
CIA may terminate employment whenever he determines such an ac-
tion to be necessary.20!l The Court declined to review the Director's 
decision under the APA,204 holding that the action was "committed to 
agency discretion."205 The Court reasoned that section 102(c) pro-
vided "no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's 
exercise of discretion," and thus there was "no law to apply. "206 As one 
commentator noted, however, the -webster decision was not based 
solely on a "no law to apply" analysis.207 Rather, the Court weighed 
more practical considerations, and in reality was reluctant to become 
involved in matters of national security.208 
In Dalton v. specter, the Court was asked to review a report created 
by the Base Closing Commission and approved by the President.209 
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act authorized the 
Commission to recommend military base closings. If the President 
approved the report and Congress did not formally disapprove it, the 
recommendations would be implemented.210 The Act was designed 
"to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and rea-
198 See ill. at 823-24. 
199 See ill. at 830-31. 
200 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 838. 
201 See ill. at 837-38. 
202 See Webster, 486 U.S. at 595. 
203 See id. at 594 (quoting § 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended). 
Section 102(c) provides that, "the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, 
terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall 
deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States." Id. 
204 See id. at 605. Significantly, however, the Court explained that the "no law to apply" 
exception does not preclude judicial review of Constitutional claints, but rather only of 
claims based on the APA. See id. 
205 See id. at 601. 
206 See ill. 
207 SeeLevin, supra note 183, at 730-31. 
208 See id. 
209 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 464-65 (1994). 
210 See id. at 465. 
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lignment of military installations."211 Holding that the President's ap-
proval of the Commission's report was not subject to judicial review, 
the Court explicitly rejected the respondents' argument that such a 
holding "virtually repudiate[d]" Marllury v. Madison.212 Significantly, 
the Court noted that the respondents had not argued that the Act 
violated the nondelegation doctrine.213 
III. IT'S ALL OR NOTHING: THE LOGICAL INCONSISTENCY PRESENTED 
BY NONDELEGATION AND "COMMITTED 
TO AGENCY DISCRETION" 
A. Standards for Nondelegation and "Committed to Agentry Discretion" 
Both nondelegation and "committed to agency discretion" in-
quiries are triggered by broadly written statutes.214 When Congress 
uses vague statutory language to delegate authority, as it often does,215 
the stage is set for plaintiffs to argue that an agency action has vio-
lated the nondelegation doctrine,216 or for the government to defend 
its action as "committed to agency discretion. ''217 For instance, in all 
post-Hampton cases, courts have commenced their nondelegation 
analyses by referencing a broad grant of delegation,218 often directly 
acknowledging it to be the plaintiff's argument.219 Similarly, the 
"committed to agency discretion" exception to judicial review rests on 
the premise that through a broad governing statute Congress has im-
pliedly granted an agency unfettered discretion.220 As such, the very 
same starting point-a broadly written statute-simultaneously impli-
cates both doctrines.221 
211 See id. at 464 (quoting § 2901 (b) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act 
ofl990). 
212 Seeid. at 477. 
213 See id. at 473 n.5. 
214 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. at 912; Webster v. Doe, 
470 U.S. 592, 601 (1988). 
215 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
216 See id. 
217 See Levin, supra note 183, at 694. Professor Levin describes the "committed to 
agency discretion" exception as a "threshold defense" such that "[w]hen the government 
prevails on this defense, a particular administrative action or finding receives no scrutiny-
not even deferential scrutiny-on judicial review." Id. 
218 See supra Section I (B) . 
219 See supra Section I (B) . 
220 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
221 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410; Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum 
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 611 (1980). 
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Moreover, courts analyze questions of delegation and "committed 
to agency discretion" in a strikingly similar fashion. 222 In both in-
stances, the court's task is to determine whether the agency's action 
was guided by a clear statutory standard.223 Specifically, a delegation is 
unconstitutional if the governing statute lacks an intelligible princi-
ple,224 and an agency action is "committed to agency discretion" if the 
governing statute provides "no law to apply. "225 
In delegation inquiries, the intelligible principle requirement is 
fulfilled when the governing statute provides an agency with 
sufficiently clear goals.226 This requirement has become in many ways 
an empty one, with courts establishing over time an extremely low 
threshold for defendants to meet.227 For example, courts have found 
that standards such as "fair and equitable"228 and "to the extent feasi-
ble"229 fulfill the intelligible principle requirement. 
Recent criticisms of the Court's increasingly more lenient appli-
cation of the nondelegation doctrine suggested that the trend might 
have begun moving toward a stricter or more moderate application.23o 
Most notably, in American Trucking, the D.C. Circuit held that EPA's 
interpretation of the standard "to protect public health" with an 
"adequate margin of safety" was too vague, and thus did not fulfill the 
intelligible principle test.231 Any speculation that the nondelegation 
doctrine might be resurrected was put to rest in February, however, 
when the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's nondelegation 
holding, reiterating in American Trucking its commitment to continue 
applying the intelligible principle test in a lenient manner, consistent 
with that of the past seventy years. 232 
222 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410;].W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 
394,409 (1928). 
223 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410;] W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
224 SeeJw. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
225 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. 
226 SeeYakusv. United States, 321 U.S. 4l4, 427 (1944). 
227 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
228 See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 427. 
229 See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,611 (1980). 
230 See American Textile, 452 U.S. at 547-48 (Rehnquist,]., dissenting); Industrial Union, 
448 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist,J., concurring); Schoenbrod, supra note 19, at 732. 
231 See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), 
opinion modified on reh'g, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(per curiam), rev'd sub nom. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903 
(2001). 
232 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903, 914 (2001). 
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The "no law to apply" test, on the other hand, is met when the 
language of the governing statute is sufficiently unclear, such that no 
meaningful standard can be discerned.233 Thus, by failing to provide 
"law" in the form of clear statutory language, Congress impliedly 
commits an action to agency discretion.234 Stated a different way, 
when Congress fails to provide "law, "235 by definition it fails to provide 
an "intelligible principle. "236 
The Court initially established the "no law to apply" test as an ex-
tremely difficult one to meet, explaining that the exception would 
apply only in "rare cases. "237 In Overton Park, the Secretary's decision 
to build a highway through a park did not escape judicial review be-
cause the statutory language "feasible and prudent" was sufficiently 
clear to constitute "law to apply. "238 It would be fair to say, additionally, 
that the statutory standard "feasible and prudent" constituted an in-
telligible principle that served to cabin the Secretary's discretion.239 
The "no law to apply" standard has become somewhat less strin-
gent.240 In several cases, the Court has found that Congress used 
sufficiently broad statutory language to warrant application of the 
"committed to agency discretion" exception.241 Significantly, though, 
in none of these cases did the Court rely solely on the "no law to ap-
ply" test.242 Instead, the Court explicitly243 or implicitly244 considered 
other factors in its analyses. Thus, while the "no law to apply" test has 
become somewhat easier to meet, it remains a relatively narrow ex-
ception that applies only in "rare cases. "245 
B. Sources of Intelligible Principles and "Law to Apply" 
Traditionally, courts have resolved both nondelegation246 and 
"committed to agency discretion"247 inquiries by looking to the lan-
233 See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988). 
234 See id. 
235 See id. 
236 SeeJ.w. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
237 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
238 See id. at 413. 
239 SeeJw. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
240 See Webster, 486 U.S. at 601. 
241 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1994); Webster, 486 U.S. at 601; Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,838 (1985). 
242 SeeDalton, 511 U.S. at 469; Webster, 486 U.S. at 600; Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831. 
243 See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 469. 
244 See Webster, 486 U.S. at 600; Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831. 
245 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
246 See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 530. 
247 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411. 
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guage of the governing statute. Specifically, courts have examined the 
relevant statutory language to determine whether an intelligible prin-
ciple248 or "law to apply"249 can be discerned. The statute serves as the 
analytical focal point because it is, of course, the tool through which 
Congress delegates.25o Moreover, the manner in which Congress dele-
gated is, in theory, precisely the issue at the center of nondelega-
tion251 and "committed to agency discretion"252 cases. 
Courts often look beyond the specific statutory provision when 
deciding whether Congress provided an intelligible principle253 or 
"law to apply. "254 Not surprisingly, courts will read the relevant statu-
tory phrase or phrases within either the context of the statute as a 
whole255 or the statute's legislative history.256 However, because the 
emphasis remained focused on Congress as the delegator, this devel-
opment was a relatively minor one.257 
In a much more dramatic shift, courts began to look beyond 
Congress (the delegator) to the agency (the delegatee).258 That is, 
both doctrines have evolved such that lower courts recently have be-
gun to allow the agency itself to provide the intelligible principle259 or 
"law to apply. "260 Although the Supreme Court made clear in American 
Trucking that such a shift is inappropriate in the context of a nondele-
gation analysis,261 thus far it has made no such finding in the context 
of a "committed to agency discretion" analysis. The same policy con-
siderations that make such a shift inappropriate in the delegation 
248 See Schechter Paultry, 295 U.S. at 530. 
249 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411. 
250 See BREYER ET AL., supra note 49, at 35. 
251 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989). The nondelegation doctrine 
requires that Congress provide a clear guiding principle when delegating. See id. 
252 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. The "committed to agency discretion" exception 
requires that Congress delegate through extremely broad and vague statutory language. 
See id. 
253 See Mistretta, 448 U.S. at 376 n.lO. 
254 SeeWebsterv. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1988). 
255 See id. 
256 See Mistretta, 448 U.S. at 376 n.10. 
257 See id. 
258 See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), 
opinion modified on reh'g, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(per curiam), rev'd sub nom. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903 
(2001). 
259 See id. 
260 See supra section II(B). This creates a tension, of course, because the agency would 
not want the court to find "law to apply." Thus, it is ironic that the agency's own policy 
statements can be used to defeat the "committed to agency discretion" defense. 
261 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903, 912-14 (2001). 
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context,262 however, are equally as applicable in the "committed to 
agency discretion" context.263 
C. Intelligible Principles, "Law to Apply, " and Judicial &view 
It is clear that the intelligible principle requirement264 and the 
"no law to apply" test265 exist in theory266 as tools by which courts de-
termine the nature of a congressional delegation. Specifically, with 
nondelegation inquiries, courts ask whether Congress gave away its 
legislative power;267 with "no law to apply" inquiries, courts ask 
whether Congress impliedly committed a particular action to an 
agency's discretion .. 268 However, it is also true that both tests fulfill an-
other important purpose as well. Both the non delegation doctrine269 
and the "no law to apply" exception270 guarantee that courts will ei-
ther have a workable standard by which to conduct judicial review, or 
in the absence of such a standard, will have a legal basis on which to 
deny review of the agency action. 
Although nondelegation was developed as a separation of powers 
doctrine to safeguard against Congressional "buck passing" and unfet-
tered agency discretion,271 it has also served a more practical purpose 
for courts.272 When Congress fails to articulate with sufficient clarity its 
substantive goals or procedural guidelines, a court has no real basis by 
which to assess an agency's actions.273 In other words, the intelligible 
principle requirement ensures that courts will have a standard by 
which to review agency actions.274 
In Yakus, the Court explicitly acknowledged the connection be-
tween the non delegation doctrine and judicial review.275 There, the 
Court explained that invocation of the nondelegation doctrine would 
be justified "[0] nly if we could say that there is an absence of stan-
262 See id. at 912;J.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
263 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
264 SeeJw. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
265 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. 
266 See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text. 
267 See J W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
268 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. 
269 SeeYakusv. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). 
270 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). 
271 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); J W. Hampton, 276 U.S. 
at 409. 
272 See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426. 
273 See id. 
274 See id. 
275 See id. 
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dards for the guidance of the Administrator's action, so that it would 
be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of 
Congress has been obeyed. "276 Unlike its traditional nondelegation 
reasoning, which focused on the need for Congress to guide an 
agency's decision making,277 the Court's reasoning in this passage 
emphasizes its own more practical need for Congress' guidance.278 
That is, by providing an intelligible principle, Congress not only limits 
the scope of an agency's discretion to within constitutional bounds,279 
but also establishes a standard by which the Court can review the 
agency's actions as well.28o 
The Court has connected judicial review even more readily and 
overtly to the "no law to apply" test281 than it has to the nondelegation 
doctrine.282 In Heckler, the Court explained that an agency action is 
"committed to agency discretion" where the governing statute is so 
broadly written that, "a court would have no meaningful standard 
against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. "283 Indeed, 
even the very name of the test implies that the exception will apply 
when there is "no law" for the court "to apply. "284 
D. The False Dilemma 
Strictly speaking, the "no law to apply" exception precludes judi-
cial review in cases where Congress has provided extremely vague and 
unclear statutory language.285 As such, Professor Levin worries that 
application of the pure "no law to apply" test as articulated in Overton 
Park will leave agency action unreviewable in the very situation in 
which judicial review is most needed.286 He writes: 
[c]onsider a case in which the relevant statutes have granted 
the agency sweeping discretion, but the challenger claims 
276 [d. 
277 See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 421. 
278 See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426. 
279 See] W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
280 See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426. 
281 SeeHecklerv. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). 
282 See infra notes 283-86 and accompanying text. 
283 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830. But see Levin, supra note 166, at 693 (arguing that the 
Court has "overemphasized" the judicial review aspect of its "no law to apply" reasoning). 
Professor Levin maintains that, "judicial review is virtually always feasible, and that the real 
question is one of desirability." [d. 
284 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830. 
285 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
286 See Levin, supra note 166, at 707. 
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the agency has exercised its discretion improperly. The chal-
lenger probably would assert this claim under section 
706(2) (A) of the APA, which states that an agency action 
shall be set aside if found to be "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an 
abuse of discretion." Under Overton Park, this type of scru-
tiny-known as arbitrariness review or abuse of discretion 
review-is simply unavailable if there is no "law to apply."287 
In other words, the "no law to apply" test allows agencies to escape 
judicial review precisely in cases where they already enjoy an extraor-
dinary amount of discretion due to the vagueness of the governing 
statute. 288 
While Professor Levin's concern is a compelling one, upon closer 
examination it proves to be unfounded. The "no law to apply" excep-
tion notwithstanding,289 there remains available an important check 
against agency arbitrariness.29o That check is, of course, the nondele-
gation doctrine.291 Because the "committed to agency discretion" ex-
ception is a statutory one provided by the APA, the Court has found 
that it precludes judicial review only of claims made under the APA.292 
More to the point, the exception does not preclude constitutional 
claims;293 thus, it does not preclude a nondelegation claim.294 
The nondelegation doctrine allows plaintiffs an indirect means 
by which to challenge an agency action, because a nondelegation vio-
lation negates an agency's power to act in the first place.295 In other 
words, although the "no law to apply" exception precludes substantive 
review of an agency action,296 a court can nonetheless overturn that 
action by invoking the nondelegation doctrine in cases where Con-
gress had granted the agency too much discretion.297 Indeed, because 
the standards for an intelligible principle and "law to apply" are essen-
287 [d. 
288 See id. 
289 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. 
290 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903, 914 (2001); J.W. 
Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
291 SeeJw. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409; American Trucking, 121 S.Ct. at 914. 
292 SeeWebsterv. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 605 (1988). 
293 See id. 
294 SeeJw. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
295 See American Trucking, 121 S.Ct. at 912. 
296 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
297 See American Trucking, 121 S.Ct. at 914. 
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tially the same,298 the nondelegation argument becomes particularly 
compelling in cases where the court finds there is "no law to apply. "299 
Of course, the nondelegation doctrine is only as meaningful a 
check as the courts allow it to be.30o During the past seventy years, the 
courts have loosened the intelligible principle requirement to the 
point that it is almost meaningless, rarely finding that a statutory pro-
vision in fact lacks an intelligible principle.301 Thus, to the extent that 
the nondelegation doctrine is "moribund,"302 Professor Levin's con-
cern may indeed prove to be well-founded after all.303 If the intelligi-
ble principle requirement were applied more strictly and with greater 
consistency, however, it would serve as a meaningful and reliable 
check in cases where judicial review is precluded under the APA.304 
E. The Real Dilemma 
Although the dilemma articulated by Professor Levin can be re-
solved on one level,305 a different, more fundamental problem looms 
within the resolution itself. While it is true that nondelegation can 
serve as a check against the seemingly unfettered authority granted an 
agency through the "committed to agency discretion" exception,306 
bringing the two doctrines together in this way reveals the contradic-
tion they embody. While one doctrine significantly expands agency 
discretion by precluding judicial review of actions governed by ex-
tremely broad delegations,307 the other mandates that such broad 
delegations be declared unconstitutional, thus nullifying the agency's 
authority to act in the first place.308 
Such a contradiction becomes even more profound in light of 
the fact that both nondelegation and "committed to agency discre-
tion" inquiries are not only triggered by broadly written statutes, but 
298 See supra Section III(A). 
299 See infra Section III (E) . 
300 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989); Schoenbrod, supra note 19, 
at 732. 
301 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903, 913-14 (2001); Mis-
tretta, 488 U.S. at 372. The Supreme Court has not struck down a delegation as unconstitu-
tional since 1936. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). 
302 See National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 352, 353 (1974); 
see also American Trucking, 121 S.Ct. at 912-14. 
303 See Levin, supra note 166, at 707. 
304 See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 421. 
305 See supra Section III (D) . 
306 See id. 
307 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 409 (1971). 
308 SeeJ.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
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are also analyzed under strikingly similar tests.309 As we have seen, a 
statute violates the nondelegation doctrine if it lacks an intelligible 
principle,3lO and qualifies for the "committed to agency discretion" 
exception if it lacks "law to apply. "311 The Court's goal under both 
tests is to determine the scope of the Congressional delegation.312 
More specifically, when a court determines that a governing statute 
lacks either an intelligible principle or "law to apply," it is determining 
that Congress has granted the agency an exceedingly large amount of 
discretion.313 
Moreover, the standards for meeting both the intelligible princi-
ple and "law to apply" tests are quite easily met. 314 Although the court 
gave teeth to the intelligible principle requirement for a short period 
in the mid-l 930s, 315 since that time the standard has become increas-
ingly more relaxed as courts have upheld extremely vague delega-
tions.316 The "law to apply" test is a similarly easy one to meet, with the 
Supreme Court stating from the outset that most statutes do in fact 
provide "law to apply," and that the "committed to agency discretion" 
exception would apply only in "rare instances."317 Despite the slight 
loosening of the "no law to apply" standard in recent cases, the test 
remains a difficult one to meet.318 The fact is, courts rarely find that a 
statute lacks an intelligible principle319 or "law to apply,"320 perhaps 
because either finding would dictate a rather extreme result. 
In the end, the nondelegation and "committed to agency discre-
tion" tests are essentially the same321 and generally lead to noncontra-
dictory results. That is, in most cases the intelligible principle re-
quirement322 or "law to apply" test323 is met, and thus the delegation is 
constitutional, or the subsequent agency action reviewable. The prob-
lem arises, however, in those rare cases in which a court finds that a 
309 See supra Section III (A). 
310 See J W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
m See Overton Park, 401 u.S. at 410. 
312 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 41O;J W. Hampton, 276 u.S. at 409. 
313 See supra Section III (A). 
314 See id. 
315 See supra Section I (B) . 
316 See supra Section I (C) . 
317 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (quoting legislative history of§ 701 (a) (2». 
318 See supra Section II (B) . 
319 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
320 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. 
321 See supra Section III (A). 
322 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
323 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. 
2001] Nondelegation 395 
delegation does lack an intelligible principle324 or "law to apply. "325 
Analytically, it appears that a delegation that fails to meet one test 
should fail to meet the other as well. When a court finds that a delega-
tion lacks an intelligible principle, it follows that the delegation also 
lacks "law to apply," and vice versa. No court has ever made such a 
finding, however, or even reasoned through the issue on the record. 
Though it seems difficult to imagine, perhaps no court has ever had 
occasion or opportunity to analyze both doctrines within a single 
case.326 
Even more problematic, however, is the logical inconsistency pre-
sented by the fact that the two doctrines, which are informed by seem-
ingly identical tests,327 demand wildly diverging results. Under the 
nondelegation doctrine, an extremely broad delegation results in the 
nullification of the delegation itself, thus revoking the agency's 
authority to act.328 Stated differently, a finding that a delegation lacks 
an intelligible principle results in the agency's complete loss of ability 
to exercise discretion.329 The "committed to agency discretion" excep-
tion, on the other hand, dictates an entirely opposite outcome.330 
Rather than resulting in the termination of agency discretion, a 
finding of "no law to apply" results in a discretionary windfall for the 
agency, shielding its actions from judicial review under the APA.331 
Of course, the "committed to agency discretion" exception does 
not shield the agency from all forms of judicial review.332 Specifically, 
it does not shield the agency from review of constitutional claims,333 
including nondelegation claims. Does it not follow, then, that if a 
court finds that a governing statute provides "no law to apply"334 it 
must also find that the statute lacks an intelligible principle, and thus 
324 See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), 
opinion modified on reh'g, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(per curiam), rev'd sub nom. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 903 
(2001). 
325 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 473 (1994). 
326 See id. at 473 n.5 (noting that respondents had not raised nondelegation argu-
ment). 
327 See supra Section III (A). 
328 See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430; Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 
121 S.Ct. 903, 912 (2001). 
329 See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430; American Trucking, 121 S.Ct. at 912. 
330 See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 473. 
m Seeid. 
332 See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 605 (1988). 
333 See id. 
334 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
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violates the nondelegation doctrine?335 Do not the terms of the two 
doctrines dictate that what a court gives with one hand336 it must take 
away with the other?337 
I propose that the real dilemma is this: the "committed to agency 
discretion" exception, as applied under the standards of the "no law 
to apply" test, is unconstitutional. By its own definition, the "commit-
ted to agency discretion" exception violates the nondelegation doc-
trine.338 If a court finds that a delegation lacks "law to apply,"339 it fol-
lows analytically that not only can the court find that the delegation 
lacks an intelligible principle, but that it must do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the current trend toward an ever-expanding administrative 
state, and given the Court's unanimous rejection of the delegation 
argument in American Trucking, it seems likely that the nondelegation 
doctrine will continue to exist in name only, and that the intelligible 
principle test will grow increasingly more empty over time. Between 
the two extremes of dogmatic adherence and blithe indifference to 
the text of the Constitution lies a reasonable and legal resolution. In 
the interest of facilitating congressional business, the Court should 
continue to uphold broad delegations as it has for the past seventy 
years. The Court should, however, draw the line at the "committed to 
agency discretion" exception by recognizing that any administrative 
rule promulgated under the authority of a statute that lacks "law to 
apply" has been promulgated outside the bounds of the nondelega-
tion doctrine, because when a statute lacks "law to apply," it lacks an 
intelligible principle as well. Moreover, because delegation is a consti-
tutional (rather than administrative) issue, it remains within a court's 
authority to review the legality of the delegation even where judicial 
335 See supra Section III (A). 
336 See Dalton, 511 U.S. at 473. 
337 See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 421; American Trucking, 121 S.Ct. at 912. 
338 See Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DUKE LJ. 657, 682 n.l05 
(1988). Professor Dripps' article focuses mainly on the implications of his proposition that 
procedural due process cases are governed by the nondelegation doctrine. See id. at 659. In 
a footnote, however, he links nondelegation with the "committed to agency discretion" 
exception to judicial review under the APA. See id. at 682 n.l05. More specifically, Professor 
Dripps suggests: "Ifmy [due process] thesis is correct, the nondelegation doctrine makes it 
unconstitutional for Congress to commit the exercise of legislative power entirely to 
agency discretion." [d. 
339 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. 
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review of the agency action is precluded by the "committed to agency 
discretion" exception. 
While it is true that delegation has become an indispensable tool 
of the legislature, and that a sudden return to enforcement of the 
1935 version of the nondelegation doctrine would paralyze Congress, 
it remains equally true that ours is (or purports to be) a government 
of representative democracy. When Congress relinquishes its legisla-
tive authority to administrative agencies, and the Supreme Court 
permits it to do so, the legitimacy of our democracy is compromised. 
Such a compromise is arguably necessary in light of the volume of 
issues to which Congress must attend, as well as the extremely com-
plex and technical nature of those issues. To be sure, the regulatory 
process is greatly benefited by the attention of expert administrators. 
Such a compromise is, nonetheless, troubling. 
Particularly troubling is the "committed to agency discretion" 
exception, which not only permits Congress to relinquish its legisla-
tive authority entirely, but in fact rewards agencies with unfettered dis-
cretion in such cases by shielding their actions from judicial review. Of 
course, to date the Court has found very few agency actions to be 
"committed to agency discretion," and even in those cases extenuat-
ing circumstances most likely account for the result. Moreover, each 
of these cases involved administrative adjudication rather than rule-
making, which suggests perhaps that courts are more willing to allow 
an agency unfettered adjudicatory power, as opposed to unfettered 
rulemaking power. 
The possibility remains, however, that a court could find that 
an agency's rulemaking action is shielded from judicial review be-
cause the governing statute provides "no law to apply." Application of 
the 701 (a) (2) exception in this way would result in a fundamental 
breakdown of the democratic process by allowing 'unelected adminis-
trative officials to promulgate rules free of congressional standards 
and of even the most deferential level of judicial review. In other 
words, applying the "committed to agency discretion" exception to 
rule making would allow Congress to escape accountability and allow 
agencies to proceed unchecked, thus leaving the American public 
without recourse or remedy. Such a result would not only violate the 
basic tenets of our Constitution, but would defy even the most rudi-
mentary notion of democracy. 

